

assigned by the Discharger, tho not intimated before the Discharge, unless it were proved that the Sum assigned was paid to the Cedent. 3 Feb. 1671 Blair contra Blair. But Warrantice in an Assignment to a Bond, is implied by the Creditor's granting a general Discharge to the Debtor bearing Receipt and Payment of all Bonds Debts &c. a Year after Delivery of the Assignation before it was intimated 24 Novemb. 1713 Macneil contra Agnew. As it absolute Warrantice in Assignations to personal Bonds imports only a Title subject, and not debitorum locupletari esse; yet Warrantice as in Assignations of Right upon or out of Land was couched to be absolute and that it is good and effectual 9 January 1674 Burt contra Reid observed by the Court. Absolute Warrantice in Assignations of Land is not calculated only against the legal Division of the Property, doth not extend to every Burden that may be put it; as to a Service of Disturage Fuel, Cart or Drove on Land duty Blair Lib. 2. Tit. 3. s. 46. Or to a Thirlage thereof to the Mill of the Land because that is an ordinary Burden upon the Land of a Barony where the Buyer is presumed to know 21 June 1672 Sandylands contra E. Kinning. But if don't find it yet determined, that a general Clause of absolute Warrantice obligeth to secure either against no Service of Thirlage or against all such. It may indeed be pleaded, that where a Thing is sold tanquam optimum maximum, it should be free of all Burden l. 90. l. 169. f. de verbi signifi. to gain a general Clause of absolute Warrantice extends not to a Service of Thirlage. 11 Feb. 1692. Fotheringham of Roxrie contra L. Gray.

Personal Warrantice is either expressed or implied. Whatever Warrantice is expressed, that must be observed l. 119. f. de act. empti. If the particular Burden or Service be expressed in the Warrantice, Recourse thereon for such is certainly competent, even where they happen after the Disposition thro the Warrantor's Fault. Absolute Warrantice in a Charter granted by the Superior burdening himself, will extend to all subsequent Distresses thro his Fault, as Recognition Escheat or Nonentry; but not thro the Forfeiture or Acquittance of his Superior, nor to the Ward or avail of his own Marriage failing thereafter, unless expressed, no provident. Man being otherwise presumed to guard against these. Nor if the Warrantice be in a Disposition granted by a Vassal, will subsequent Distresses by the Forfeiture Recognition Nonentry or Escheat of the Superior affect the Disposer, but only the Acquirer, unless the Clause bear such Distresses present and to come. A general Clause of all Dangers Perils and Inconveniencies subjoined to several Particulars, is not to be stretched to others of greater Importance than any of them Stair Lib. There is little Advantage by special Clauses of Warrantice, unless thereby future Deeds inferring Eviction or which would not infer it ex natura rei be expressed. For the general Clause reacheth all

Evictions

Evictions arising from anterior Causes. Nay the Effect is the same in a Right for onerous Causes, viz. Simus si Nonis or equivalent Value tho no Clause of Warrantice be expressed. Personal Warrantice is implied or understood, according as the Deed is onerous or gratuitous. An adequate onerous Cause infers absolute Warrantice, tho no Warrantice be expressed (raig Feud. Lib. 2. Tit. 4. s. 162. Stair Lib. Vers. Warrantice in a Personal Obligation. But in a gratuitous Cause a Person disposing even for onerous Causes is not liable to warrant, unless he is expressly bound to it, for otherwise the Acquirer is presumed to take his Care. In gratuitous Rights, as pure Gifts (Hope Warrantice) (Vickel contra Tailors) or a Legacy rei aliena proinde legata 16 June 1674. or a Disposition of all Right the Acquirer is not bound to warrant, but from future necessary Deeds and Proceedings, tho no Clause of Warrantice be expressed. The Reason is, because the Acquirer is presumed to take his Care. But Deeds are fraudulent. Act. 15. Dec. 17. Act 140. Dec. 17. 16. But one who disposes for mere Honesty of Conscience is not answerable for his posteriors necessary Deeds in Payment of his anterior Obligation, because he is presumed to dispose only such Right as he hath labi qua. Under gratuitous Deeds for which simple Warrantice is inferred, Law comprehends Rights granted from the Moderation of Gratitude or former Merit or Service done or to be done, or even in annual Feudalty to be paid if there was no anterior Consideration of Money or Value given Stair Lib. Because Merit or Gratitude do work no civil Obligation; and a Vassal becomes free of subsequent Performances or Duties in case of Eviction. Sir Robert Spotswood (Dratt. Tit. Warrantice) says, that any Thing disposed by a Man to his Son or Grandchild pro filiali amore, doth not import Warrantice.

Real Warrantice, is when the Infeftment in one Tenement, is given in Security of another. But the Warrantice in Dispositions and Resignations is unquestionably personal and comes not within the real Right, nor obligeth a singular Infeftment to the Author. Nor is such a Right of Warrantice carried by a Disposition to a singular Successor, unless it be assigned specially or generally in the Assignment to the Rights and Evidence Stair Lib. s. 46. pr.

All which Agreements concerning Warrantice, have their Justice, in that Rights are acquired at a cheaper or dearer Rate according to the Nature of the Warrantice, or upon other Views; and that the Acquirer purchases in Effect only what is sold, and such as the Seller is willing to warrant it. The Exception of a Right in the Warrantice of a Disposition