

of Payment of the Provision, that Child's Portion expieth in the Surv. or is considered as the only Child. Stewart 307. One having obliged himself to pay to his younger Children particular Sums on the thereof at the Term of Whitsunday or Martinmas after his Decease, and the other Half at their respective Majorities and the Ages of 21 Years with this Proviso, that in Case of the Decease of those Children when they attain to such an Age without being married or having taken the Portion of the Child deceasing should accrue to the surviving Children; and be equally divided amongst them the eldest draw a Share with him; and one of these Children who was a Daughter had died before her Father without attaining to the Age of 21 Years another who was a Son brought on Action against his eldest Brother the Heir for a Share of his Sister's Portion. It was pleaded for the Heir that his Sister having died before her Father her Portion like a Legacy, was never due, and consequently could not pass to Heirs and Substitutes; for that Bonds of Provision payable at a certain Term are conditional, provided the Children who are Creditors survive such a Period, and if they do not the Provision and Institution is void and where there is no Institution, there can be no Substitution. In which it was answered, that in the common Case of Legacies, the Legatee if he died before the Testator, cannot transmit to his Heir the Hope of the Legacy which was all he had at his Death; yet the Testator may substitute one to the Legatee, who in Case of his Dying before the Testator may enjoy the Legacy. In this Case it is not properly by Way of Substitution, that the Children draw their Share of the Portion of the deceased, but as conditional Institutes after the Condition is purified they need no Service to the Sister deceased nor by getting her Portion voidable to her Debts. The Court found that the Provision of the deceased Child accued to the surviving Children. January 1728. *contra Denholm of Cranshaw.*

A Question is commonly proposed of Children who are in the Condition are in the Disposition, that is to say, if a Substitution being made to one in Case he should happen to die without Issue, the Children who surviving their Father make the Right of Substitution to cease are themselves substituted. Some (Ara. Fidei. Controv. Lib. 4. Cap. 51. de Comm. ad Tit. f. de Lib. & posthum. N. g. *de Leg. Liviles ec. Tom. 1. Part. 2. Liv. 5. Tit. 3. Sect. 3. Arts. 102*) with better Reason, of a contrary Opinion that there is no Substitution with Respect to the Children. For when one does no other Thing but ~~disposes~~ <sup>disposes</sup> in Favour of a Substituted

Substitute, in Case the Institute have no Children his Intention appears to be, that in Case here be Children, their Father shall not be any longer charged with the Substitution but shall have free Liberty to dispose of the Estate in Favour of whom he will which he could not do had he had no Children. The Substitution he would have substituted ~~himself~~ <sup>himself</sup> in the first Place and not after another might be except in Default of the Institute. Thus a Clause in a Contract of Marriage in Case the Contract should be dissolved preferred behind the contracting Parties, and as it was found a *revo. Obligatio* to provide that Estates in Favour of Heirs Male of the Marriage 2 January 1706. June 2 of that Year in *Stewart v. Stewart*. Possible Conditions in real Rights are either personal ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> or affecting the Receiver, and his Heirs or real effecting a singular Beneficiary. The personal Conditions or Provisions are Clauses in *Stewart v. Stewart* Inst. Lib. 2. Tit. 1. §. 4. in fin. (Clauses of Warrandice *Stair* Inst. Lib. 3. §. 54. in fin.) where a Disposition bears both in the Precatory a *signation* and Precept of Heir, a Clause that the Receiver should be obliged to pay all the Disponent's Debts contracted in his Contract, that Clause will import only a personal Obligation upon the Receiver, the Disposition to pay these Debts and will not affect the Land, upon the Receipt of a singular Successor to him. *Stewart v. Stewart* Inst. Lib. 3. §. 54. in fin. Real Conditions with which Dispositions or other Rights may be burdened are reserved to Parents one or more, which pass therewith effectually as a real Burden to all singular Successors without any other Infeftment than what they are ingrossed in and the Exception of other Infeftments is, if in the dispositive Clause, effectual against such Successors *Stair* Inst. §. 53. Again Faculties or Powers reserved to the Grantors of Rights to affect or burden them either absolutely at their Pleasure, or with certain Sums to Children or Creditors are real Burdens affecting the Subject disposed. Which reserved Faculties in Dispositions by Persons to their eldest Sons are amply interpreted against the Receivers of such Rights and their Heirs, the more strictly against singular Successors acquiring from them for onerous Causes *Stair* Inst. §. 54. Thus a Father having in a Disposition of his whole Estate to his eldest Son, reserved a Power to burden the same with a Sum, and thereafter granted a movable Bond to his Daughter, the said Estate, in so far as the Father's Excess fell short, was found affected with the Bond tho it made no Mention of the reserved Power, 24 June 1677 *Koppringle contra Koppringle*. One having disposed his Estate to his Son in his Contract of Marriage, reserving Power to burden it with Portion to his younger Children, an heretable Bond of Provision granted by him thereafter